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Abstract: One harmful consequence of creating categories where one group is unique and
superior to others is that it justifies committing negative, often atrocious, acts on the
members of the inferior group. Correcting divisive human categorizations (racial
superiority, gender superiority) has bettered society. Scholars have often claimed that
humans are unique and superior to nonhuman animals. These claims need to be
reevaluated. Many have already been refuted. Animals have been shown to outperform
humans in many tasks, including cognitive ones. Here we raise the question: Has the false
sense of superiority been used to justify human cruelty to animals?
Colin A. Chapman has conducted research in Kibale National Park in Uganda for
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Humans have the propensity to place things into categories (i.e., good vs. bad, full vs.
empty, black vs. white), which can directly shape how we view the world. Since
categorization shapes our actions, it is important to evaluate their validity and distinctness
and the degree to which one category blurs into the next. One categorization that has
intrigued scholars for centuries is that of humans versus nonhuman animals. We often put
humans on a pedestal, as unique and superior to all other animals: one of a kind; unlike
any other animal. For example, in the 17th century, Rene Descartes stated that only people
were creatures of reason, linked to the mind of God, while animals were merely machines
made of flesh. His follower Nicolas Malebranche went on to say that animals “eat without
pleasure, cry without pain, grow without knowing it: they desire nothing, fear nothing,
know nothing.” Today Descartes’s and Malebranche’s statements may seem extreme and
wrong (Call, 2006), but they clearly reflect the propensity to see animals and humans as
very different and humans as superior.
The view of humans and animals has changed since the 17th century (Fuentes,
2018; Marks, 2016; Van Schaik, 2016), thus these categories need to be reevaluated. Other
categorizations have changed dramatically over time, with very positive effects on human
societies. When the U.S. Declaration of Independence and Constitution was written, “only
white male property holders [were] deemed adequately endowed to be included in the
category of personhood” (US 1776). This is no longer the definition of personhood. In fact,
the question of whether great apes warrant being accorded personhood is generating
much academic interest today (Kurki and Pietrzykowski, 2017; Shyam, 2015; Wise, 2014).
A second reason to reevaluate the human/animal distinction is that many of our
previous criteria for human uniqueness have proved wrong. Thomas Carlyle (1833) stated
that “Man is a tool-using animal. Without tools he is nothing, with tools he is all” (Carlyle,
1833). This definition of “Man the Tool Maker” was largely viewed as true until the 1960s,
when Jane Goodall’s observations of chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) using tools to extract
termites from their mounds (with the help of publicity from National Geographic)
eventually invalidated Carlyle’s definition. It had taken well over a century (Goodall, 1986;
Goodall, 1964). Prior to the Goodall findings, there had already been considerable
evidence, largely ignored, that the definition was flawed. For example, in 1925 Köhler
reported a series of simple experiments that clearly demonstrated chimpanzees could use
tools and even cooperate in tool use to obtain food rewards. The chimpanzees would pile
boxes one on top of another and then use sticks (even putting two sticks together) to reach
a food reward hung high above their heads. Several primate species have now been shown
to be habitual tool users, some maintaining tool-using cultures for hundreds of
generations (Haslam et al., 2017).
Today we know that tools are also used by many non-primate species such as
elephants (Hart and Hart, 1994), Caledonia crows (van Casteren, 2017), African grey
parrots (Pepperberg, 2004), sea otters (Hall and Schaller, 1964; Fujii et al., 2014), rodents
(Nagano and Aoyama, 2017), octopuses (Finn et al., 2009), and some fish (Bernardi, 2012).
A similar failed criterion had been put forward in 1891 by Sir William Osler, who
stated: “A desire to take medicine is, perhaps, the great feature which distinguishes man
from other animals.” The subsequent extensive documentation of medicinal plant use by
chimpanzees (Figure 1) and other primates opened the flood gates for research in this area
(Huffman, 1997; Huffman, 2007), leading to examples of medicine use not only by other
mammals (e.g., elephants, bears, civets, coatis, porcupines), but also birds (e.g., snow
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geese, finches, raptors) and insects (e.g., bumble bees, ants, butterflies) (Engel, 2002;
Huffman, 2007).

Figure 1: Chimpanzees use plants for their curative properties. Here the individual is folding and
swallowing the whole leaves of Aspilia mossambicensis, one of over 40 different species ingested
in a way that has been shown to physically purge intestinal worms from Africa great apes (Huffman
et al., 1997).

Chu (2014) suggested that humans are unique in their ability to build complex structures.
A number of authors have since echoed this (Fuentes, 2017; Marks, 2015) despite the
evidence of complex living constructions by animals such as beavers (Castor canadensis),
birds, bees and wasps (Doucet et al., 1994; Hansell, 2000; Hepburn et al., 2016). Termite
mounds are remarkable structures with specific areas built for different purposes,
elaborate features for draining water and cooling the mound, and even gardens to cultivate
fungi as a source of food and medicine (Darlington, 1985; Korb, 2003; Korb, 2010).
These and many other such claims about putative defining differences between
humans and animals span from 1833 to 2014 have proved wrong. Yet the desire to see
humans as unique still remains. Is this a valid scientific question? One of the distinctive
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features of science is hypothesis testing (Cartmill, 1990; Popper, 1968). If hypotheses
about human uniqueness repeatedly prove to be wrong for one trait after another, does
this not imply that the hypothesis itself is wrong? We can keep resurrecting the hypothesis
with new traits not yet considered, but to what end?
Evolutionary theory is a widely accepted explanation for the diversity of life on the
planet. If uniqueness were intended to mean humans are one of a kind, unlike anything
else, this would contradict evolution. Evolution consists of changes in genetically coded
traits: if a new trait is advantageous for survival and reproduction in the environmental
setting in which it occurs, its frequency will increase. Any trait (e.g., human intelligence)
must have its roots in common ancestors; there are no “Hopeful Monsters” as proposed by
Goldschmidt (1940). Matt Cartmill (1990) summarized this well when reviewing some of
the early critics of natural selection. Some scholars argued that natural selection could not
account for some human traits, such as our intellectual capacities and our moral faculties,
as they could not have been generated through survival of the fittest variants among apelike ancestors. This argument was countered by Darwin (1871) and his followers who
simply asserted that these traits had selective advantages and thus the moral and
intellectual gap between humans and other higher mammals was only a matter of degree.
All genetic traits are derived from predecessor traits; thus, there are similarities among
the closest living relatives.
Many claims about the uniqueness of people state or imply that humans are
superior to animals. In both Judaism and Christianity, humans are said to be made in the
image of god and given dominion over lower creatures (Genesis). Aristotle believed that
plants and animals were made for the sake of humans (Taylor, 1984). A number of
religions in the Orient believe in the concept of a gradation of beings, with humans being
the ultimate state. In Jainism there are four states with gods the highest, humans second,
suffering in hell the third, and plants and animals last (Laidlaw, 1995). Belief in human
superiority is clearly deep-rooted. When scholars make such assertions today, they often
select traits on an ad hoc basis according to what they view as important among the things
at which humans excel. Examples include the traits discussed above (tool use, medicine,
construction). As part of Tetsuro Matsuzawa’s 40 years of research on chimpanzee
cognition (Matsuzawa, 2017), one candidate, the ability to solve complex problems, was
examined in a beautiful study by Inoue and Matsuzawa (2007). They developed a memory
test in which numbers where shown on a computer screen and then covered by opaque
boxes. Chimpanzees were rewarded if they touched the boxes in the sequence that the
numbers had been represented (i.e., 1 to 5). The researchers concluded that their study
“shows that young chimpanzees can quickly grasp many numerals at a glance, with no
decline in performance as the hold duration is varied. Moreover, the young ones showed
better performance than adults in the memory task. Our study shows that young
chimpanzees have an extraordinary working memory capability for numerical
recollection, even better than that of human adults” (Inoue and Matsuzawa, 2007).
Claims of human superiority are used to justify human cruelty toward animals
(Arluke, 2017), such as those raised for food (Taylor and Fraser, 2017). They mirror how
claims of ethnic superiority are used to justify atrocities and even genocide against people
trying to escape from famine or violence (Kunst et al., 2017; Staub, 1989).
We think it is time for our species to use our intellect to change our actions. This
must start by recognizing that while differences exist between animals and humans or
4
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among cultures or peoples, they should not be ranked vertically. Differences are value-free
and of interest because they provide diversity, whether genetic or cultural; studying them
allows us to better understand ourselves. Problems arise only when a cultural belief
infringes on the rights and safety of others (Mechoulan, 2017; Twining et al., 2000;
Bauman et al., 2014).
There are many differences (and similarities) between human and nonhuman
species, just as there are differences (and similarities) between any two species, any two
cultures, or even any two individuals. However, since all traits cannot be taken into
account simultaneously, it is inappropriate to accord superiority to a subset of traits that
are preselected in a biased or ad-hoc fashion. Species can be compared on a suite of
singled-out traits, as is done in multivariate university rankings, but the exercise is likely
to be just as arbitrary.
We should use the traits we are so proud of — our vaunted intellect,
communication skills, and morality — to create positive change. There is little doubt that
now is the time when these skills are desperately needed. The world’s ecosystems are in
peril. Since our species is the major cause, we must provide solutions. Biodiversity is being
lost at an accelerating rate, with current extinction rates approximately 1,000 times higher
than background rates observed in the fossil record (Pimm et al., 2014). Extant vertebrate
species have declined in abundance by approximately 25% since 1970 (Dirzo et al., 2014).
Between 2000 and 2012, 2.3 million km2 of forest were lost globally, and in the tropics,
tropical forest loss has increased annually (Hansen et al., 2013).
To put this in perspective, the area of forest lost is approximately the size of Mexico.
Global estimates of the extent of wildlife over-exploitation are very poor; however, in
Africa, four million metric tons of bushmeat are extracted each year from the Congo basin
alone (equivalent to approximately 4,500,000 cows, or 80 million small (5 kg) monkeys).
(Not all bushmeat is primate; Fa and Brown, 2009.) Global temperature is predicted to
increase by 1.5°C by the end of the 21st century (IPCC, 2014) and researchers have
projected that by 2100, 75% of all tropical forests present in 2000 will experience
temperatures that are higher than the temperatures presently supporting closed canopy
forests (Wright et al., 2009; Peres et al., 2016).
These statistics illustrate that we continue to place human profit ahead of the rights
of animals and the ecosystems that support them, not to mention the rights of future
human generations. An example of the drive for profit is that the conversion of forest to
oil palm plantations was responsible for 3 million hectares of deforestation from 20002011 (an area the size of the Philippines) (Vijay et al., 2016). This was a significant factor
leading to the loss of 100,000 orangutans between 1999 and 2015 (Voigt et al., 2018). Ever
more land is projected to be needed for agricultural activities because of human
population growth and people electing to eat higher up on the food chain (Delgado, 2003).
Yet this is also the time when people have options to use products not containing palm oil,
to eat lower on the food chain, and to use products that do not support the deforestation
of tropical forests. As the duration of inaction continues, the options available to society
become progressively limited — climate change represents a clear example (IPCC, 2018).
Many human traits once thought unique to our species have proved to differ only
in degree from those of many other species living on the planet. We cannot survive without
many of those other species today; it is because of the existence of other species that we
exist. We need to treat them with the respect they deserve and not judge their intelligence
5
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by how much they resemble us, nor evaluate them only on the basis of what they provide
us. We need to acknowledge how much we resemble them and how much we have to learn
from them. Doing so will allow us to make decisions — such as whether to use palm oil or
how high on the food chain to eat — with a realistic understanding of the consequences of
our actions, for them as well as for us.
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